University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 23
Number 2 Fall, 1992

Article 8

1992

Recent Developments: Williams v. United States:
Supreme Court Establishes National Consensus
Regarding the Scope of Appellate Review under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Gloria A. Worch

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Worch, Gloria A. (1992) "Recent Developments: Williams v. United States: Supreme Court Establishes National Consensus
Regarding the Scope of Appellate Review under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 23 : No.
2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol23/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

"induced an individual to break the law
and the defense of entrapment is at
issue .. . . the prosection must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was disposed to commit the
criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents."
Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing
United Statesv. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1991».
The Court next explained that in a
situation where an individual is merely
presented with the opportunity to commit a crime, the immediate willingness
to engage in criminal conduct gives a
clear indication ofa defendant's criminal predisposition. Id. at 1541.
Jacobson's conviction, however, involved an extended effort on the part of
the Government, culminating in an
arrest only after twenty-six months of
ongoing correspondence with fictitious
organizations. Id. Thus, the Court
ruled that although Jacobson may have
been predisposed to receive mail-order
child pornography by the time of his
arrest in 1987, the Government did not
prove that this inclination developed
independently ofthe investigation directedtowardJacobsonsince 1985. Id.
The evidence produced by the Governmentconcerning Jacobson's sexual
propensity prior to the law enforcement mail campaign was insufficient
to support a finding of his predisposition to commit a criminal act. Id. The
Court opined that the receipt of two
magazines from a California bookstore,
as the sole piece ofsuch pre-investigative evidence, could indeed indicate
Jacobson's desire to view sexually oriented photographs. Id. This inference,
however, merely demonstrated a certain preference to act within a broad
range of sexual conduct, only some of
which was criminal, and thus was not
probative ofa predisposition to engage
in illegal activity. Id. The Court
further acknowledged that because
most people tend to obey the law even
if they disagree with it, evidence of
one's inclination to perfonn what was
once a lawful act does not justify an
inference ofa tendency to perfonn that
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which is now illegal. Id. at 1542.
Similarly, the Court emphasized
that evidence produced during the investigation failed to prove Jacobson's
predisposition to receive child pornography through the mail. Id The Court
viewed his responses to the many communications prior to the commission
ofthe actual crime as indicative only of
Jacobson's personal inclinations and
interests rather than sufficing as proof
of any criminal design on his part. Id.
Furthennore, the Government's tactic
in its solicitation was to suggest to
Jacobson that viewing the prohibited
sexually oriented materials should be
within his constitutional privilege of
freedom of choice. Id. The Court
concluded that the Government exerted considerable pressure on him to
obtain the outlawed materials as a protest against an encroachment on his
constitutionally guaranteed individual
liberties. Id. Consequently, rational
jurors could not detennine beyond a
reasonable doubt that, absent the protracted investigation by the Government, Jacobson was autonomously predisposed to commit the crime. Id. at
1543.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rhenquist, Justice Kennedy, and in
part by Justice Scalia, maintained that
the majority's position unnecessarily
usurped a reasonable jury inference of
predisposition. Id. at 1544. In the
dissent's view, the holding redefined
the tenn ''predisposition'' and placed a
new requirement on law enforcement
officials by demanding a detennination ofa "reasonable suspicion ofillegal activity before contacting a suspect." Id.at 1544. Theminorityargued
that the Government cannot induce a
suspect to commit a criminal act
through its communications until it
actually provides the opportunity to
engage in such illegal conduct, because until then, there can be no finding of an implantation of criminal design in the mind ofan innocent person.
Id. In addition, the dissent lamented
that the Government must now show

not only that a suspect was predisposed
to commit a crime before an opportunity was presented, but also that such
person was criminally predisposed
before the Government came on the
scene. Id. at 1545. Furthennore, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the readiness with which Jacobson responded
to the opportunity to commit the crime
indicated that he likely would have
broken the law if left to his own devices. Id at 1543-44.
Jacobson v. United States represents an important clarification of the
law of entrapment because it places a
limitation on the Government's use of
undercover agents to enforce the law.
The Supreme Court thus has reaffirmed
the individual's right of freedom from
unwarranted government intrusion by
recognizing a level of intervention by
law enforcement officers at which a
finding ofcriminal predisposition by a
jury is unreasonable. Jacobson will
effectively prompt the courts to scrutinize more carefully law enforcement
sting operations, and will ultimately
provide criminal defendants with a
heightened opportunity to argue for
exoneration if induced to engage in
illegal activity by government officials.
- Scott N. Alperin
WUJiams v. UnitedStates: SUPREME
COURT ESTABLISHES NATIONAL CONSENSUS REGARDINGTHESCOPEOFAPPELLATE
REVIEWUNDERTHESENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984.
In Williams v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 1112 (1992), the Supreme Court
reviewed the Sentencing Refonn Act
of 1984 ("Sentencing Act") in an attempt to establish a national consensus
on the scope of appellate review when
a district court's sentence varies from
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines ("Guidelines").. The
Court held that when a lower court
relies on both valid and invalid factors
during sentencing, a reviewing court
cannot affirm a sentence solely on its
independent assessment that the dis-

trict court's departure from the Guidelines sentencing range was reasonable.
The United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin
convicted Williams of possession ofa
firearm while a convicted felon. The
district court departed from the
Guideline's recommended sentencing
range of 18 to 24 months for a criminal
with Williams' criminal history. The
court determined that this sentencing
range was inadequate because the range
failed to take into account two outdated convictions and several previous
arrests and sentenced Williams to 27
months imprisonment based on section 4A1.3 of the Guidelines Manual.
This section allows a district court to
increase a sentence "if 'reliable information' indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflectthe seriousness ofthe defendant's
criminal background or [his] propensity for future criminal conduct." Id. at
1117. Applying the appellate review
provisions ofthe Sentencing Act, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Williams's conviction and
sentence. Id.
The Sentencing Act permits district courts to depart from the recommended sentencing range established
by the Sentencing Guidelines in certain circumstances. To ensure proper
application of the Sentencing Guidelines by the district courts, the Act also
provides for limited appellate review
of sentencing in section 3742(f). Id. at
1118. Section 3742(f)(1) provides for
remand ofthe case ifthe sentence "was
imposed in violation oflaw or imposed
as a result ofan incorrect application of
the sentencing guidelines." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)(1988». In
addition, section 3742(f)(2) provides
that the appellate court may set aside
the sentence and remand if the sentence was "outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or was
imposed for an offense for which there
is no applicable sentencing guidelines
and is plainly unreasonable." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2)(1988».
In affirming Williams's convic-

tion, the court of appeals agreed with
the district court's assessmentthat''the
two outdated convictions were 'reliable information,' indicating more extensive criminal conduct than was reflected by Williams's criminal history
category." Id. at 1117 (citing Williams
v. UnitedStates,910F.2d 1574(1990».
The court ofappeals, however, rejected
the district court's reliance upon
Williams's past arrests which had not
resulted in prosecution. The court of
appeals noted that the Sentencing Act
prohibits a court from departing from
the Guidelines based only on.a prior
arrest record. Id (citing § 4A1.3 ofthe
Guidelines Manual). Nevertheless, the
court of appeals affirmed Williams's
sentence, concluding that "despite the
District Court's error in considering
Williams's prior arrest record, the court
had 'correctly determined that Mr.
Williams's criminality was not reflected properly in the criminal history
category and that the relevant evidence
justified the rather modest increase in
sentence.'" Id. at 1118 (quoting WilIiams, 910 F.2d 1574, 1580 (1990».
The United State Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether
a reviewing court may affirm a district
court sentence based on valid and invalid factors which differ from the
Guideline range.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering Williams' argument
that the use of his arrest record as a
reason for departure was a misapplication of the Guidelines, and that the
"incorrect application" standard established in section 3742(f)(1) required
remand once a departure ground was
invalidated. Id at 1119. The Supreme
Court found that for purposes ofappellate review pursuant to section
3742(f)(1), it is an "incorrect application" of the Sentencing Guidelines
when a district court departs from the
applicable sentencing range based on a
factor, which was previously rejected
by the Sentencing Commission as an
appropriate basis for departure from
the guideline range. Id.
TheSupremeCourtnextturnedto

the provisions of the Sentencing Act
which set forth the scope of appellate
review when a district court makes an
"incorrect application" of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1120. The Court
noted that when a district court relies
on an improper ground in departing
from the guideline range, a reviewing
court is precluded from affirming a
sentence "based solely on its independent assessment that the departure was
reasonable" under section 3742(f). Id.
That provision, the Court explained,
specified two circumstances in which
an appellate court must remand for
resentencing: "(1) if the sentence was
imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the Guidelines or (2) if
the sentence is an unreasonable departure from the applicable guideline
range." Id. The Court noted, however,
that while unreasonable guidelines
departures are reviewed under section
3742(f)(2), "incorrect application" of
the guidelines requires the same review under section 3742(f)(1). Id
Next, the Supreme Court set forth
a two-part inquiry that the reviewing
court is obliged to conduct in order to
determine whether to apply section
3742(f)(1) or section 3742(f)(2). Under section 3742(f)(1) remand is required if an appellate court finds that
the sentence was "imposed either in
violation of law or as a result of an
incorrect application ofthe Guidelines."
Id. If, however, the appellate court
determines that the departure is not the
result of an interpretive or applicative
error, it should question whether the
"resulting sentence is an unreasonably
high or low departure from the relevant
guideline range," and remand the case
as specified in section 3742(f)(2). Id.
The Court refused to interpret these
provisions as requiring an automatic
remand to rectify every "incorrect application" of the Guidelines and indicated that a remand is necessary only if
the sentence was "imposed as a result
of an incorrect application" of the
Guidelines.Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, the Court explained that an appellate court's determination of
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whether the sentence was imposed "as
a result of' a misapplication of the
Guidelines depends on ''whether the
district court would have imposed the
same sentence had it not relied upon
the invalid factor or factors." Id. Applying this test, the Court noted that
when a district court intentionally departs from the Guideline range, the
court's sentence is "imposed 'as a result of' a misapplication ofthe Guidelines, if the sentence would have been
different but for the district court's
error." Id.
This decision provides substantial
insight into the scope of appellate review under the Guidelines of the Sentencing Reform Act. The Supreme
Court in Williams gave an extremely
narrow reading to the scope of such
review, and emphasized the deference
that appellate courts are to give to a
district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion. In so ruling, the Court
established a national consensus on the
scope of appellate review under the
Sentencing Reform Act.
- Gloria A. Worch
3011 Corp. v. District Court:
CORPORATIONS CHARGED
WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL.
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court,

327 Md.463, 610 A.2d 766 (1992), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a corporation has a right to a trial
by jury when it is charged with a criminal offense carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment in excess of 90
days. In a unanimous decision, the
court interpreted section 4-302(e)(2)(i)
ofMaryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as providing a statutory right to a jury trial based on the
maximum penalty provided for the
offense itselfand not the penalty likely
to be imposed upon a particular defendant. Therefore, although a corporation is not subject to imprisonment, it
is entitled to a jury trial.
3011 Corporation, trading as U.S.
Books, and L.R. News, Inc., trading as

Edgewood Books, were adult book
stores in Harford County. Both corporations were charged with 100 counts
of knowingly displaying sexually oriented material for advertising purposes
in violation ofart. 27, section 416D of
the Maryland Code. Each violation
was punishable by a fine of up to
$1,000 or imprisonment of up to six
months. Both corporations also were
charged with one count of exhibiting
obscene matter in violation of art. 27,
section 418 of the Maryland Code.
The penalty for this charge was up to a
$1,000 fme and/or imprisonment up to
one year. Similar charges were filed
against Larry Hicks, who was an officer of both corporations.
All parties requested a jury trial.
The District Court for Harford County
granted Mr. Hicks's demand for a jury
trial and subsequently tninsferred his
case to the Circuit Court for Harford
County. However, the district court
denied both corporations' request for a
jury trial and the corporations filed
petitions for writs of certiorari to the
Circuit Court for Harford County. After
a hearing, the petitions were dismissed
and the corporations appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals ofMaryland.
While the appeal was pending, the
counts for exhibiting obscene material
were dismissed. Before argument in
the court of special appeals, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ
of certiorari to determine whether a
corporation charged in district court
with a criminal offense carrying a penalty in excess of 90 days had a right to
a jury trial.
Thecorporations argued in the court
of appeals that they had a statutory
right to jury trial under section 4302(e)(2)(i) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, and that they were
entitled to a constitutional right to a
jury trial under Articles 5,21, and 23 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 3011 Corp., 327 Md. 46768, 610 A.2d 768. The State argued
that no corporation ever has the right to

ajury trial under the statute because the
statute requires a defendant to be subject to more than 90 days imprisonment and a corporation cannot be imprisoned. Id. at 468, 610 A.2d at 768.
The State contested the Maryland constitutional right to a jury trial by arguing that the charge was a minor offense
to which the right to jury trial does not
attach. Id, 610 A.2dat768-69 (citing,
e.g., State v. Huebner, 305 Md. 601,
608-10,505 A.2d l331,l335 (1986».
The State also argued that there was no
federal constitutional right to a jury
trial for corporations since a corporation could not be imprisoned and the
maximum fines were not substantial.
Id., 610 A.2d at 769.
The court of appeals found a right
to a jury trial through statutory interpretation and did not reach the constitutional issues. The court ruled that if
the crime with which the defendant is
charged carries a penalty of imprisonment in excess of 90 days, a criminal
defendant is entitled to a jury trial ifhe
makes a timely request in district court.
Id. at 469, 610 A.2dat 769. Thecourt
rejected the State's contention that the
particular defendant must be subject to
imprisonment in excess of 90 days,
holding that ''the maximum penalty
provision relates to the offense itself
and not the parti~ular defendant." Id.
(emphasis in original). The court found
that the Maryland General Assembly
distinguished between less serious and
more serious criminal offenses by authorizing more than 90 days imprisonment for more serious crimes. Id
Thus, the option of a jury trial was
allowed for offenses with a maximum
penalty in excess of90 days. Id. The
court emphasized that the controlling
principle guiding the constitutional
right to a jury trial is the maximum
sentence and place ofincarceration that
the legislature established for the particular offense, not the maximum sentence or place ofincarceration to which
this particular defendant may be subjected. Id (citingKawamurav. State,
299 Md. 276, 292, 473 A.2d438, 447
(1984». The court found that the Mary-
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